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The European car distribution system has been scrutinized by the European Commission for
thirty years. After a ﬁrst period during which manufacturers and retailers had to submit their
contracts to the Commission in order to get an individual exemption from the application of
article 81(1) (previously 85(1)) of the Treaty of Rome, the distribution of cars has been covered
by a sector-speciﬁc block exemption since July 1, 1985. There was a ﬁrst revision of the
block-exemption in 1995, then a second in 2002 that changed drastically the legal framework
of car distribution in the EU. In addition to the regulation of distribution agreements, the
Commission is publishing since 1993 a report on car prices within the EU every six months.
In the Commission’s view, the report ”has created greater price transparency on recommended
retail prices and induced consumers to acquire cars in another Member State where prices
are lower” (Commission of the European Communities (2000)). However consumers willing
to take advantage of price diﬀerentials within the single market by purchasing their car from
foreign dealers often experienced diﬃculties in doing so. While some dealers declare not to be
interested in such sales, dealers who are willing to sell ”quote delivery times which are much
longer than their normal delivery times” (CEC (2000)). The Commission was informed of many
such cases of discrimination against foreign customers as compared with domestic buyers, which
is a violation of the Treaty. These complaints from consumers lead the Commission to initiate
several investigations between 1995 and 1999 to verify whether measures had been taken by
manufacturers vis a vis dealers ”with the aim of restricting or preventing sales to customers from
other Member States in a way which was contrary to Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95” (CEC
(2000)). The 2002 Regulation is clearly inﬂuenced by practices the Commission discovered
during these investigations. It sets a series of rules to prevent discrimination against customers
from other parts of the single market in terms of availability, prices and delays. Following the
Regulation, dealers must be able to supply customers from any part of the single market under
the same conditions. Any clause that aims at preventing or discouraging dealers from selling to
foreign customers is forbidden. However, the Regulation does not oblige manufacturers to serve
dealers everywhere within the EU with the same delay. Typically, delivery delays may diﬀer
from one country to the other for several reasons, from genuine ones (logistic organization,
distance between the market and the plant,...) to strategic ones. In this paper, we show
that manufacturers may use delays of delivery to implement a proﬁtable fragmentation of the
single market, in order to prevent parallel trade between low price and high price countries
while maintaining a substantial price diﬀerential between the two countries. We show that this
1practice may be welfare reducing1
More speciﬁcally, our model studies the interaction between the producer of a durable
good located in one market (the ”national” market), two retailers, one located on the national
market, the other one on a diﬀerent but contiguous market (the ”foreign” market), and two
price-taking consumers, one on each market. Consumers have a switching cost to buy the good
”abroad”, that is on the market other than the one on which they are located. They diﬀer
according to their willingness to pay for one unit of the good: it is higher on the national
market than on the foreign market. The producer oﬀers a menu of franchise contracts that
are identical with respect to the wholesale price, but diﬀer regarding the delays of deliveries of
the product and the ﬁxed fees.2 The existence of diﬀerent franchise contracts can be thought
as ”show room” versus ”oﬃcial dealer” franchise contracts: oﬃcial dealers own inventories of
the ﬁnished product, allowing consumers to use the good immediately after purchasing, while
”show rooms” have to ask for the good at the time it is purchased by consumers, inducing a
delay. Retailers accept one (or none) of the contracts and set prices. With immediate delivery
in both countries, the price diﬀerential is limited by the level of switching costs, due to the
possibility of arbitrage by consumers. If the willingness to pay of local and foreign consumers
diﬀer by more than the switching cost, that is if markets are not naturally separated, the
manufacturer faces a trade-oﬀ between either extracting the entire willingness to pay of local
consumers but renouncing to supply the foreign market or supplying both markets but leaving
rents to local consumers. By delaying delivery in the foreign country, the manufacturer is
able to extract the entire willingness to pay both of the national and the foreign consumers.
Price diﬀerential in equilibrium ultimately exceeds the switching cost, as well as the diﬀerence
between consumers willingness to pay without delays: the delay imposed on the foreign market
reduces the intertemporal foreign consumer’s beneﬁt and in turn increases the diﬀerence in
valuations. Even if price diﬀerential is increased, it is not possible for the national and high
willingness-to-pay consumer to buy on the foreign market because at the foreign price and
delay, he is earning a strictly negative payoﬀ.
Our ﬁndings contrast with previous work on price discrimination in the European car mar-
1As usual price discrimination by a monopoly is not always welfare reducing. One of the objectives that
the Treaty assigns to European competition policy is however the creation of a single market, and thus the
elimination of any barrier to cross-border trade ﬂows within the EU. From that point of view price discrimination
that results from market separation is ”bad”.
2Allowing for diﬀering wholesale prices would raise supplementary issues that are not central to this paper,
while leaving the main results unchanged.
2ket. Kirman and Schueller [1990] show that diﬀerences in prices may be explained by imperfect
competition between producers, but also by diﬀerences in tax rate. They consider a model of
oligopolistic competition where on each market there is a dominant producer except on one
speciﬁc market where there is no national producer. They show that in markets where the
dominant producer has high costs, the prices of all the products are higher. In markets where
the tax rate is high, the pre-tax prices are lower. Finally in the market where there is no
dominant producer, prices are lower. Verboven [1996] estimated a model to explain price dif-
ferences between new cars within the European Community: he shows that three factors are
particularly interesting, namely the existence of a local market power (national producers in
France, Germany, United Kingdom and Italy, beneﬁt from a lower price elasticity than others),
binding import quotas constraints (in France and Italy against Japanese cars), and collusion
(which cannot be rejected in Germany and United Kingdom).
Our study is related to previous works on intertemporal price discrimination for durable
goods (see e.g. Stockey [1979],Bagnoli, Salant, and Swierzbinski [1989], Anderson and Gins-
burgh [1994], K¨ uhn and Padilla [1996] and K¨ uhn [1998]). None of those papers are however
analyzing the impact of retailers competition on the strategy of a monopolistic producer, in
presence of a transportation cost between markets. As shown by our study, these speciﬁcities
are at the core of the car distribution system in Europe. Delaying the delivery of a durable good
can be interpreted as lowering the quality of the good: our paper is therefore related to the
literature on vertical diﬀerentiation in oligopolistic competition. Departing from Gabszewicz
and Thisse [1979], [1980], and Shaked and Sutton [1982], non integrated retailers would not
choose to diﬀerentiate themselves with respect to delays since short delays of delivery are not
more costly to implement than long delays, or would not diﬀerentiate as much as the upstream
monopolist would like them to if short delays were more costly to produce than long ones.
Our paper is organized as follows: in the second section we present the model, and in the
third section we deal with the existence of an equilibrium. In the fourth section we analyze the
benchmark case, where there are no delays in the delivery, to prove that discrimination cannot
occur. In section 5 we determine the producer’s optimal delays choices in the delivery. Finally
the last section discusses our results and concludes.
32 The model
Let a producer PN of an homogenous, indivisible and durable good be able to sell it through
two retailers, RN on the domestic or national market N and RF on a foreign market F. On
each market there is only one price-taking consumer buying one unit of the durable good, CN
on the domestic market and CF on the foreign market.
To market the good retailer RN chooses a retail price pN ∈ R+, and retailer RF chooses
a retail price pF ∈ R+, given the franchise contract FC signed with the producer. A mixed
strategy for retailer RN (respectively RF) is a probability measure σN (respectively σF) on a
support Supp(σN) ⊆ R+ (respectively Supp(σF) ⊆ R+). As usual a mixed strategy σx may be
any type of distribution, continuous or discrete, on Supp(σx). Let Σ denote the set of mixed
strategies from which each retailer can choose. Retailers RN and RF do not suﬀer any cost to
market the good, apart those speciﬁed in the franchise contract.
A franchise contract FC is oﬀered at the beginning of the game by producer PN. It consists
in a wholesale price w ∈ R+ charged by the producer PN for any unit sold by the retailer, a
ﬁxed fee T ∈ R+ paid by the retailer to the producer, and a date at which the producer delivers
the good, τ ∈ N. We assume that PN can oﬀer two diﬀerent contracts FCN and FCF on which
retailers self-select. We restrict our attention to contracts having the same wholesale price to
avoid arbitrage by retailers, but diﬀering with respect to ﬁxed fees and delays of delivery,
FCN = (w,TN,τN) and FCF = (w,TF,τF) (1)
Contracts are therefore observable, and PN proposes the contracts via a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer.
Finally producer PN does not suﬀer any cost to produce the good.
Each consumer chooses the retailer he wants to buy from, depending on the pairs (px,τx)
observed on each market. Let vx be the constant instantaneous ﬂow of beneﬁt generated by
the consumption of the durable good for x = N,F. For the sake of tractability we assume
that vN > vF = 1. Moreover the good does not depreciate, consumers are inﬁnitely living and
obtain a 0 beneﬁt if they do not buy the good. Finally we assume that buying on one’s foreign
market (i.e. CN buying from RF or CF buying from RN) induces an additional switching cost
￿ ≥ 0 for the consumer. Let δ < 1 be the discount factor identical for all consumers. If he buys





tvx − py − ￿ · Ix6=y
4where we assume that the good is paid on order, Ix6=y being equal to one when x 6= y and 0




in order for the problem to be signiﬁcant: if the switching cost ￿ exceeds the diﬀerence between
the valuations for the good, the markets are naturally separated and manufacturer PN does
not need to introduce delays of delivery to restore exclusive territories.
Some simpliﬁcations give immediately that
• uN(pN,τN) = δτN
1−δvN − pN if CN buys the good from RN,
• uN(pF,τF) = δτF
1−δvN − pF − ￿ if CN buys the good from RF,
• uF(pN,τN) = δτN
1−δ − pN − ￿ if CF buys the good from RN,
• uF(pF,τF) = δτF
1−δ − pF if he buys the good from RF.
When choosing its supplier, each consumer simply compares the net beneﬁts in both cases.
We assume that when a consumer is indiﬀerent between both retailers, he chooses to buy the
good in his own country. Moreover when he is indiﬀerent between buying or not, each consumer
chooses to buy. These natural assumptions guarantee the upper semi-continuity of the industry
proﬁt. In this setting, each consumer buys either from RF or from RN, depending on the prices






1 to Rx if ux(px,τx) ≥ ux(py,τy), ux(px,τx) ≥ 0
1 to Ry if ux(px,τx) < ux(py,τy), ux(py,τy) ≥ 0
0 if max{ux(px,τx),ux(py,τy)} < 0
(3)
We assume that the two retailers RN and RF and the producer PN have the same discount










Supp(σF)(pF − w) × DF(pN,pF,τN,τF)dσN dσF − TF (5)
3This assumption is not restrictive: we could instead assume that the good is paid at delivery. When deciding
to buy or not, consumers would still compare two intertemporal net satisfactions, the one drawn from delayed
consumption being lower than the one drawn from an immediate delivery.
5where Dy(pN,pF,τN,τF) is the aggregated demand addressed to the retailer Ry, for y = N,F.
Producer PN’s payoﬀ is
ΠP(w,τN,τF,TN,TF) = w × (D
N(τN,τF) + D
F(τN,τF)) + TN + TF (6)
where Dy(τN,τF) denotes the quantity asked to retailer Ry at the equilibrium of the price com-
petition sub-game for a given pair of delivery dates (τN,τF), and for y = N,F.
3 Existence of an equilibrium in the retail competition
sub-game
First let us characterize the total demands received by retailers as a function of delays and prices.
Consumer CN buys from retailer RN if his net beneﬁt is higher than the beneﬁt obtained from
buying to RF. Moreover he buys from any retailer if the beneﬁt he earns is positive or equal
to 0. These incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints can be re-written as

        
        
uN(pN,τN) ≥ uN(pF,τF) ⇔ pN ≤ pF + ￿ + δτN −δτF
1−δ vN
uN(pN,τN) ≥ 0 ⇔ pN ≤ δτN
1−δvN
uN(pF,τF) ≥ 0 ⇔ pF + ￿ ≤ δτF
1−δvN
(7)
Similarly consumer CF buys from retailer RF if the net beneﬁt he obtains from consuming is
positive and higher than the beneﬁt of buying to retailer RN,

        
        
uF(pF,τF) ≥ uF(pN,τN) ⇔ pN ≥ pF − ￿ + δτN −δτF
1−δ
uF(pN,τN) ≥ 0 ⇔ pN + ￿ ≤ δτN
1−δ
uF(pF,τF)) ≥ 0 ⇔ pF ≤ δτF
1−δ
(8)
When aggregating the individual demands to establish the demand addressed to each retailer,
there are three diﬀerent cases depending on the delays on each market. Moreover those three
cases will lead to discontinuous demands and therefore to discontinuous retailers’ payoﬀs. Before
describing fully the demand system and its consequences on the existence of an equilibrium
6to the retail competition sub-game, let us come back brieﬂy on the reason for which this
discontinuity exists.
We have assumed that there were only two price-taking consumers diﬀering by their will-
ingness to pay vN and vF = 1, suﬀering a switching cost ￿ to buy ”abroad”. If ￿ were equal to
0, then we would be in the standard Bertrand case: the maximal demand of two units would
be driven to the retailer charging the lowest price, shared in case of retail prices being equal.
When ￿ is strictly positive, it exists a region for the retail prices in which the two retailers sell
exactly one unit, but prices do not need to be equal anymore. This enlarges the region in which
both retailers sell one unit compared to the case in which there is no switching cost. One way
to suppress this ”diagonal” discontinuity in the payoﬀs would be to introduce many consumers
diﬀerentiated with respect to their switching costs ￿. This solution increases the number of
regions in the demand system to consider, solving the existence problem by continuifying the
payoﬀs, but has the drawback to lead to never ending discussions on the parameters of the
model. We opted for the discontinuous version of the payoﬀs, since the result we want to es-
tablish can be found in a more elegant way in a discontinuous but computationally tractable
setting4. We can now describe the three cases for the demand system.
Case 1 If the delays are such that δτF vN
1−δ −￿ ≥ δτF 1
1−δ and (δτN −δτF)
vN
1−δ +￿ > (δτN −δτF) 1
1−δ −￿
then the pair of aggregated demands (DN(pN,pF,τN,τF),DF(pN,pF,τN,τF)) addressed
to retailers is
(0,0) if pN > δτN vN
1−δ and pF > δτF vN
1−δ − ￿
(1,0) if δτN vN
1−δ ≥ pN ≥ δτN vN
1−δ − ￿,pF > δτF 1
1−δ, and pN ≤ pF + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ
(0,1) if δτF vN
1−δ − ￿ ≥ pF ≥ δτF 1
1−δ, and pN ≥ pF + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ
(1,1) if pN ≤ pF + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ,pN ≥ pF − ￿ + (δτN − δτF) 1
1−δ, and pF ≤ δτF 1
1−δ
(2,0) if pN < pF − ￿ + (δτN − δτF) 1
1−δ and pN ≤ δτN vN
1−δ − ￿
(0,2) if pN > pF + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ and pF ≤ δτF 1
1−δ
This case is depicted in ﬁgure 1 from appendix B.
Case 2 If the delays are such that δτF vN
1−δ −￿ < δτF 1
1−δ and (δτN −δτF)
vN
1−δ +￿ > (δτN −δτF) 1
1−δ −￿
then the pair of aggregated demands (DN(pN,pF,τN,τF),DF(pN,pF,τN,τF)) addressed
4The ”vertical” discontinuities resulting from prices exceeding willingness to pay can be smoothed by intro-
ducing many consumers diﬀerentiated with respect to their willingness to pay.
7to retailers is
(0,0) if pN > δτN vN
1−δ and pF > δτF vN
1−δ
(1,0) if δτN vN
1−δ ≥ pN ≥ δτN 1
1−δ − ￿, and pF > δτF 1
1−δ
(0,1) if δτF vN
1−δ − ￿ ≤ pF ≥ δτF 1
1−δ, and pN ≥ δτN vN
1−δ
(1,1) if pN ≤ pF + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ,pN ≥ pF − ￿ + (δτN − δτF) 1
1−δ,
pF ≤ δτF 1
1−δ, and pN ≤ δτN vN
1−δ
(2,0) if pN < pF − ￿ + (δτN − δτF) 1
1−δ and pN ≤ δτN 1
1−δ − ￿
(0,2) if if pN > pF + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ and pF ≤ δτF vN
1−δ − ￿
This case is depicted in ﬁgure 2 from appendix B.
Case 3 If the delays are such that δτF vN
1−δ −￿ ≥ δτF 1
1−δ and (δτN −δτF)
vN
1−δ +￿ ≤ (δτN −δτF) 1
1−δ −￿
then the pair of aggregated demands (DN(pN,pF,τN,τF),DF(pN,pF,τN,τF)) addressed
to retailers is
(0,0) if pN > δτN vN
1−δ and pF > δτF vN
1−δ − ￿
(1,0) if pN ≤ δτN vN
1−δ,pN ≥ δτN 1
1−δ − ￿ and pN ≤ pF + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ
(0,1) if pN > δτN 1
1−δ − ￿,pF ≤ δτF vN
1−δ − ￿,pF ≥ δτF 1
1−δ
and pN > pF + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ
(1,1) if pN ≤ δτN 1
1−δ − ￿,pN ≥ pF + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ,
and pN ≤ pF − ￿ + (δτN − δτF) 1
1−δ
(2,0) if pN > δτN 1
1−δ − ￿ and pN < pF + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ
(0,2) if pF ≤ δτF 1
1−δ and pN > pF − ￿ + (δτN − δτF) 1
1−δ
This case is depicted in ﬁgure 3 from appendix B.
Let us deﬁne Γ(FCN,FCF) the retail price competition sub-game for a given pair of fran-
chise contracts. Retailers’ payoﬀs are not continuous with respect to prices (pN,pF). Neither
are they quasi-concave. Solving this type of games is generally a diﬃcult exercise, since one
has to determine Nash equilibria in mixed strategy. However we do not need to know the equi-
librium for each franchise contract: in equilibrium the contracts oﬀered by the producer induce
a Nash equilibrium in pure strategy in the retail price competition sub-game. Obtaining an
upper bound on the expected proﬁts of the retailers is then suﬃcient to solve the full game, by
eliminating the sub-game with Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies by a dominance argument.
This is what is done in lemmas 1, 2, 3, 4 below. Let us show before that our game possesses a
Nash equilibrium.




   














N − TF for any pF ∈ R+
(9)
We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy in every retail competition sub-
game Γ(FCN,FCF) following the methodology developed by Reny (1999). We apply Reny’s
framework in two steps: ﬁrst (proposition 1 below), we prove that the mixed extension of the
game is better reply secure for any (FCN,FCF). Then it directly follows (corollary 1 below)
that the game possess a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy.
Better reply security in the context of pure strategies corresponds to the following property
(Reny (1999), p. 1032-1033): for every non equilibrium pair of prices (b pN, b pF) and every pair of
proﬁts associated (b ΠN, b ΠF), such that lim(pN,pF)→(b pN,b pF) Πx(pN,pF) = b Πx for every x = N,F,
some player can secure a payoﬀ strictly above b Πx at (b pN, b pF). A player x can secure a payoﬀ
strictly above b Πx at (b pN, b pF) if it exists px such that Πx(px,p−x) > b Πx for p−x in an open
neighbourhood of b p−x. This property is obviously satisﬁed by the standard Cournot game:
for every pair of quantities diﬀerent from the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, at least one player is
not on his best response function. This player can obtain a payoﬀ strictly better by playing
a best response to the opponent’s choice, even when the opponent modiﬁes slightly its action.
The same analysis can be done in the standard Bertrand game with identical and constant
marginal costs: for every pair of prices diﬀerent from the marginal costs, at least one player can
increase its proﬁt by playing a price on its best response. Moreover the proﬁt functions in the
classic Bertrand game are quasi-concave. Therefore Reny (1999) theorem 3.1, can be applied
to guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategy5.
Even if the game Γ(FCN,FCF) is extremely close to the standard Bertrand game, the proﬁt
functions are not quasi-concave. Therefore Reny’s existence result for Nash equilibria in pure
strategy cannot be used. The reader may check in ﬁgure 1 that at the wholesale price w there is
no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. For example (pF,pN) = (w,w +￿+(δτN −δτF)
vN
1−δ) cannot
be a Nash equilibrium: RF is better oﬀ increasing its price. For any pair of prices higher,
5Obviously Reny’s machinery is not needed since the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game can be
computed.
9RF is better undercutting RN. Those two forces are going in opposite directions, leading to
the non existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We use instead Reny’s corollary 5.2,
that guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy. To do it, we need to
verify that the mixed extension of the game is better reply secure. We follow Reny (1999)
methodology by proving that the industry proﬁt is upper semi-continuous and that the mixed
extension of the game is payoﬀ secure. Those two properties imply that the game is better
reply secure. Let us establish the formal result.
Proposition 1 The mixed extension of the retail competition sub-game Γ(FCN,FCF) is better
reply secure for any pair of delays (τN,τF), for any wholesale price w, and for any ﬁxed fees
(TN,TF).
Proof: See appendix A.k
Corollary 1 The retail competition sub-game Γ(FCN,FCF) has a mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium for any pair of delays (τN,τF), for every wholesale price w and for any ﬁxed fees (TN,TF).
Proof : See appendix A.k
We may now turn to the characterization of some special cases that will help us to show
that the delays in the delivery may be used by a producer to separate two markets and increase
his proﬁts.
4 The benchmark case : no delays in delivery
To show that introducing delays of delivery may be a matter of strategy for producer PN, let
us ﬁrst consider the situation where there are no delays at all. In that case, if the diﬀerence
between the consumers gross beneﬁts is suﬃciently large compared to the switching cost ￿,
both retailers are in direct competition. Under the assumption (2), the aggregated demands
DN(pN,pF) and DF(pN,pF) addressed to each retailer are a particular case of ﬁgure 1 for
τN = τF = 0. Depending on the wholesale price chosen by the upstream monopolist, the
retailers payoﬀs are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If the diﬀerence between the consumers gross beneﬁts is large enough, i.e. if (2)


































F)) < ( 1
1−δ + ￿ − w, 1
1−δ − w) if w ∈ [0; 1
1−δ]
Proof : See appendix A.k
From this last result, it is immediate that the upstream producer ﬁnds proﬁtable to oﬀer
a contract with a wholesale price w between
vN
1−δ − ￿ and
vN
1−δ, and a ﬁxed fee T =
vN
1−δ − w.
This contract is accepted by retailer RN only, since it is indiﬀerent between retailing the good
or not while retailer RF is better oﬀ refusing the contract to avoid losses. Another proﬁtable
contract is w between 1
1−δ and
vN
1−δ − ￿, in that case T = 0. Any other contracts with lower
wholesale prices lead to strictly lower proﬁts for the upstream monopolist: he does not oﬀer
them. Amongst the proﬁtable contracts, one is of a particular interest: w = 1
1−δ and T = 0.
In that case the retailers are selling 2 units (1 each), retailer RN realizes a proﬁt ￿ > 0 that




1−δ −￿ > 0. Retailer RF earns nothing, and consumer CF has a 0 satisfaction. The
producer’s trade-oﬀ is therefore the following: when oﬀering the ﬁrst contract, (w,
vN
1−δ − w),
the producer’s proﬁt is equal to
vN
1−δ. This proﬁt has to be compared to the proﬁt obtained
with the contract ( 1
1−δ,0), which is equal to 2
1−δ since the producer is supplying two units. The
comparison is obvious. Therefore we have proved
Proposition 2 In absence of delays in the delivery, producer PN is unable to price discriminate
the demand.
- If vN > 2, PN may oﬀer any contract (w∗,T ∗) = (w,
vN









welfare is constituted by the producer’s proﬁt only, SW =
vN
1−δ.
- If vN ∈ [1;2], PN oﬀers the contract (w∗,T ∗) = ( 1
1−δ,0). Both retailers accept it, and both
consumers obtain the good from their local retailer at prices p∗
N = 1
1−δ + ￿ and p∗
F = 1
1−δ.
Producer PN’s proﬁt is equal to 2
1−δ, retailer RF’s proﬁt is equal to 0, retailer RN’s proﬁt
is equal to ￿ and consumer’s surplus is equal to
vN
1−δ − 1





11Note that as a direct consequence of the demand system, there is no distortion on the Social
Welfare when the willingness to pay on the producer’s national market is low enough, vN < 2.
However the producer cannot extract all the surplus, and has to leave some proﬁt to its national
retailer. This last result comes from the fact that the producer cannot oblige the retailer RN
to accept a contract in which he is paying the same wholesale than RF while having to pay a
higher ﬁxed fee. RF would simply accept the contract, buy 2 units of the good and sell 1 to
RN directly. Introducing delays in the delivery of the durable good allows to extract a larger
part of the consumers surplus, and is proﬁtable for the producer even if the social welfare turns
out to be lower.
5 Separating the markets by delaying the deliveries
Let us start by establishing the proﬁts earned by retailers depending on the delay of delivery
of the durable good.
Lemma 2 If the delays (τN,τF) are such that δτF vN−1
1−δ ≥ ￿ and (δτN − δτF)
vN−1
1−δ > −2￿, and





2￿ ∈ [δτF 1
1−δ,δτN 1
1−δ − ￿], the expected proﬁts obtained













F)) = (δτN vN
1−δ − w,0) if w ∈ [δτF vN







F)) = (￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ,0) if w ∈ [δτN 1







F)) = (￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN













F)) = (2 (δτN 1












F)) < (δτN vN
1−δ − w,δτF vN
1−δ − ￿ − w) if w ∈ [0;δτF 1
1−δ]





2￿ > δτN 1
1−δ − ￿, RN serves CN and CF when w ∈
[δτF 1
1−δ,δτN 1





2￿ < δτF 1
1−δ then RN serves only CN
when w ∈ [δτF 1
1−δ,δτN 1
1−δ − ￿].
12Proof: See appendix A.k
In another conﬁguration of the parameters,
Lemma 3 If the delays (τN,τF) are such that δτF vN−1
1−δ < ￿ and (δτN − δτF)
vN−1
1−δ > −2￿ the













F)) = (δτN vN








F)) = (δτN vN
1−δ − w,δτF 1
1−δ − w) if w ∈ [δτF vN






F)) < (δτN vN
1−δ − w,δτF 1
1−δ − w) if w ∈ [0;δτF vN
1−δ − ￿]
Proof: See appendix A.k
Note that there is a region in which the two retailers are selling the good to their local
consumer, at the highest prices possible.
Lemma 4 If the delays (τN,τF) are such that δτF vN−1
1−δ ≥ ￿ and (δτN − δτF)
vN−1
1−δ ≤ −2￿ the













F)) = (δτN vN
1−δ − w,0) if w ∈ [δτN 1







F)) = (δτN vN
1−δ − w,0) if w ∈ [2δτN 1
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F)) < (δτN vN
1−δ −w,δτF vN










1−δ ∈ [δτN 1
1−δ − 2￿ − (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ,δτF vN
1−δ − ￿] and 2δτN 1
1−δ −
δτN vN
1−δ −2￿ ∈ [δτF vN
1−δ −￿,δτN 1
1−δ −￿]. Else some expressions disappear from the proﬁt function
in an obvious manner.
Proof: See appendix A.k
Before analyzing the choice of delay made by the upstream monopolist, let us characterize
the main diﬀerence between a delay in the delivery and a genuine quality parameter by showing
that the two retailers never diﬀerentiate with respect to delays. Whenever he increases the
delay at which he is able to deliver the good, a retailer decreases the proﬁt he is able to realize
when serving his local consumer, and lowers the attractiveness of his product compared to his
opponent. He is not able to attract the consumer from the other region any more. This strategy
is obviously dominated for any wholesale price w. Therefore τ∗
N = τ∗
F = 0. Consider ﬁrst the
case
vN−1
1−δ > 2￿. In that case only lemmas 2 and 3 are relevant for the analysis. More precisely
only the condition δτF vN−1
1−δ ≥ ￿ matters for the proﬁt. First note that choosing a delay low
enough is always dominant: for a given wholesale price, τN is always such that δτN vN
1−δ > w,
and τF is always such that δτF 1
1−δ > w. The proﬁt of retailer RN is in expectation lower than
δτN vN
1−δ −w, which is maximal when τ∗
N = 0 no matter the delay chosen by retailer RF. On the
other hand the proﬁt of retailer RF increases when τF goes to 0, to be equal to δτF vN
1−δ −￿−w
for τF low enough, such that δτF vN−1
1−δ ≥ ￿. The dominant strategy is again for RF to choose
τ∗
F = 0. In the case where
vN−1
1−δ ≤ 2￿, the dominant strategy is again for retailer RN to choose
τ∗
N = 0: retailer RF also chooses τ∗
F = 0 in that case. We then have proved
Proposition 3 If retailers RN and RF were able to commit to delays of delivery, respectively
τN and τF, they would never choose to diﬀerentiate. The equilibrium in which delays are chosen






for any wholesale price w and franchise fees TN and TF.
If there were a cost of delivering the good earlier (i.e. if the cost of ”producing a good
of high quality” were higher than the cost of ”producing a good of low quality”), then there
would still be an externality exerted by one retailer on the other that the producer would ﬁnd
proﬁtable to internalize. The upstream monopolist would be better oﬀ choosing the delays.
14Consider now a situation in which the delay τN is set to 0 on market N, and is positive
on market F, τF > 0. In that case only lemmas 2 and 3 are relevant for the payoﬀs of the
upstream producer PN. Indeed substituting τN = 0 in the conditions governing the demand
systems, we obtain for lemma 2 the conditions δτF vN−1
1−δ ≥ ￿ and (1 − δτF)
vN−1
1−δ > −2￿, and for
lemma 3 the conditions δτF vN−1
1−δ < ￿ and (1 − δτF)
vN−1
1−δ > −2￿. Obviously (1 − δτF)
vN−1
1−δ > 0
and therefore lemma 4 is not possible. The following proposition shows the contracts oﬀered
by PN in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Producer PN is able to discriminate the demand by optimizing τF and oﬀering































The franchise fee T ∗
N is higher for contract CN than the franchise fee T ∗
F for contract CF: retailer
RN chooses CN and retailer RF chooses CF.
Proof : Start in the situation where the diﬀerence between the gross beneﬁts from consuming
is large enough, i.e.
vN−1
1−δ > ￿. In that case the demands are given as in ﬁgure 2. We know that
the price competition sub-game ends in a situation where the producer either looses a market
or looses a large amount of proﬁt. What happens if τN = 0 and τF increases ? The demands
are for a while given as in ﬁgure 3, but when τF is high enough, the demands are given as in
ﬁgure 4. Indeed the beneﬁt earned by CN when he buys the good to RF decreases at a higher
rate than the beneﬁt earned by CF when he buys to RF. The condition to be in ”ﬁgure 4
conﬁguration” when τN = 0 is
δτF
1 − δ










The second condition is always true. The ﬁrst condition resumes to
δ
τF vN − 1
1 − δ









15Choosing a wholesale price w ∈ [δτF
1−δvN − ￿; δτF












and this equilibrium will be more proﬁtable for PN. Clearly the consumers are doing a 0 beneﬁt
in that case, and the producer will be able to obtain all the proﬁt in the game through the fees.
Since the utility of CF diminishes with τF, PN chooses the ﬁrst delay such that he may
separate the markets, τF solution of
δτF
1 − δ
vN − ￿ =
δτF
1 − δ
and he charges w = δτF 1
1−δ. Each retailer accepts the contract that has been designed for him.k
Is it possible for PN to do better than this equilibrium ? Again if he increases the delay of
delivery on market N keeping delay τF at the value computed in proposition 4, it lowers the
diﬀerence between the two market and makes it more and more proﬁtable for consumer CN to
buy abroad. Therefore it reduces the eﬃciency of his strategy. Moreover CN’s beneﬁt decreases.
There is less to extract from the market, and producer PN will prefer to delay the delivery on
market F only. Figure 4 presents the intuition of the result. By delaying the delivery on market
RF, PN manages to sell the good at the highest price to consumer CF on this market, δτF
1−δ,
while making sure that at this price consumer CN buys on his national market even if he is
charged his entire valuation
vN
1−δ.
Let us do some comparative statics on the delay τ∗
F imposed on the foreign market: obviously
if buyers are inﬁnitely patient, i.e. if their discount rates tend to 1 by smaller values, the delay
applied on the foreign market τ∗
F increases up to inﬁnity. Provided that δ is strictly lower than
1, then the delay is decreasing with the switching cost ￿: the higher is the natural barrier to
parallel trade, the lower the delay will be on the foreign market. Finally the largest is the
diﬀerence between the willingness to pay, vN − 1, the higher is the delay: restricting parallel
trade requires a higher delay when the natural diﬀerence in (maximal) prices is high.
Another interesting remark concerns the diﬀerence between the retail prices. From the proof









Using the expression of the delay in equilibrium (forgetting the fact that it has to be an integer),
we can roughly bound this price diﬀerence from below. Since δτF <
￿(1−δ)















> ￿ ⇔ vN(vN − 1) − ￿(1 − δ) > ￿(1 − δ)(vN − 1)




This assumption is exactly the one under which our model is constructed. Therefore the
diﬀerence between the retail prices exceeds the switching cost, ∆p∗ > ￿. Delaying the delivery
prevents consumers’s arbitrage between the two markets, and allows retailers to exert fully their
local monopoly power. Note that since δτF < 1, the price diﬀerential in equilibrium also exceeds
the diﬀerence between the valuations,
vN−1
1−δ . The use of delays increases the price diﬀerential
up to a level higher than the natural diﬀerence between valuations.
Finally and before characterizing the Social Welfare that results from the existence of delays,
one has to make sure that this strategy does not give PN a proﬁt lower than the proﬁt obtained
by selling the good immediately to the two consumers, that is realizing a proﬁt equal to 2
1−δ.





1−δ: PN chooses to oﬀer diﬀerent franchise
contracts to his retailers if δτ∗
F > 2 − vN. Since to be able to discriminate the delay on market
F has to be such that δτ∗
F <
￿(1−δ)
vN−1 , it suﬃces to establish conditions such that 2 − vN <
￿(1−δ)
vN−1
to have the solution of proposition 4 has an equilibrium of the game. It is equivalent to search
for vN such that −v2
N + 3vN − 2 − ￿(1 − δ) < 0. We have ∆ = 1 − 4￿(1 − δ): if this value is
negative, that is if ￿(1−δ) > 1
4 then any vN is such that the delayed delivery is chosen. In that
case we can establish the following corollary that compares Social Welfare. The other cases can
be derived easily.
Corollary 2 By price discriminating through the delays, producer PN obtains the entire Social




1−δ, retailers’s proﬁts are equal to 0 and consumers’s
surplus is equal to 0.
- When vN ∈]1,2], the Social Welfare is lower with delays than without: the low willingness
to pay consumer CF gets a lower utility from buying the good later.
- When vN > 2, the Social Welfare is higher with delays than without: the low willingness
to pay consumer CF obtains the good.
Remark that if vN is too close to 1, then there is no point in delaying the delivery of the
good. The producer is better oﬀ serving all consumers immediately. However there is a non
17empty set of parameters such that even if vN < 2 producer PN ﬁnds proﬁtable to serve CN
ﬁrst. The delayed delivery used by the manufacturer hurts the foreign buyer while it extracts
the whole surplus of the national buyer. Instead of leaving a rent to the national buyer, the
producer reduces the beneﬁt he earns on the foreign buyer to be able to increase the price on
the national market and take back all the proﬁt through the ﬁxed fee.
6 Discussion
We have shown that a producer may use his retail network to discriminate consumers demand by
imposing delays in the delivery of a durable good. The consumer with the highest willingness to
pay obtains the good earlier than the other, and pays his entire valuation for it. The consumer
with the lowest willingness to pay is delivered with a delay. This delay is decreasing with the
cost of switching from one market to the other, and increasing with the diﬀerence between the
willingness to pay: the lower the switching cost is, the more costly it is to reduce intrabrand
competition by delaying the delivery of the good. Similarly the larger the diﬀerence between
consumers’ valuations, the higher is the incentive of high valuations consumers to switch from
their market to the other: the delay has to increase on this market. For some parameter values,
we show that the strategy of delaying the delivery lowers the Social Welfare. Our result is a
noticeable exception to the Coase conjecture: because of consumers switching cost between the
two markets, selling the good later at a lower price on one market - the one where consumers
have the lowest willingness to pay - is possible. It can therefore be connected to K¨ uhn [1998],
who shows that diﬀerences in quality and production costs between a durable and a non-durable
good may be used to discriminate the demand, and to K¨ uhn and Padilla [1996], who show that
the Coase conjecture does not hold when a durable good monopolist sells non durable goods
that are demand-related to the durable.
Even if it is a vertical parameter, retailers do not diﬀerentiate according to the delay of
delivery, contrary to the results established for a quality (Gabszewicz, Thisse (1979), (1980),
Shaked and Sutton (1982)). The main reason is the following: when increasing the delay at
which he is able to deliver the durable good, a retailer exerts a positive externality to its
opponent without increasing its beneﬁt from diﬀerentiating itself. Its opponent can indeed
charge higher prices without fearing to loose consumers now unwilling to wait any longer to
buy on the other market. Consumers buying from him are ready to pay a lower amount for the
good, since they will enjoy the service of the durable good on a shorter period. Each retailer
18able to do it would choose no delay at all. However retailers turn out to be the producer’s tool
to discriminate consumers. The practice we point out here neither excludes nor is included
in classic vertical diﬀerentiation, but can be seen as another tool to help a monopolist with a
retail network to increase its proﬁt.
In order to discriminate eﬃciently (i.e. without letting the revenues decrease too much
because of time), the producer has to charge a wholesale price higher than his marginal cost.
If we were to consider a model closer to the structure of the Car manufacturing and retail-
ing industry, we should obviously consider many consumers with diﬀerences in tastes and in
willingness to pay, but also introduce competition at the manufacturing and retailing levels.
If there were many consumers, for example with individual valuations distributed on a line
with a linear or quadratic transportation cost, the producer would then have an incentive to
let double-marginalization occur in the retail competition sub-game. Retailers would sell less,
and the discrimination strategy through delays of delivery would have an additional cost, since
less consumers would be able to buy the good. This eﬀect can be counter-balanced by an
increase in the delay. The trade-oﬀ between discrimination and market coverage would then
appear without cancelling the proﬁtability of the delay strategy. In the context of competition
between producers, with new retailers on each market, increasing the delay may be dangerous
since the retailer may loose consumers on the market where the delay is long. However this
eﬀect depends drastically on the diﬀerentiation between the two producers: if the goods they
are producing are close substitutes (i.e. if the retailers are close on the Hotelling line), clearly
increasing the delays will hurt a producer with a third eﬀect, an increased competition made
by his competitor if he has chosen short delays on his market. If on the contrary the goods
are diﬀerentiated enough (i.e. if the retailers are far one from the other on the Hotelling line),
increasing the delay will not decrease the demand addressed to the retailer by a large amount,
and then an incentive to discriminate through this method will reappear.
Finally some remarks on the Competition Policy consequences of our ﬁndings on the Euro-
pean car market. We have shown that even if consumers are perfectly informed about prices,
the possibility of diﬀerent delays combined with the existence of a switching cost lead to market
separation. This rises two questions: ﬁrst, how to progress towards unifying the market, that
is, reduce the price dispersion within the European Union? Second, it is optimal to do so?
Unifying the market can be achieved by either forcing ﬁrms to oﬀer identical delays between
countries, or by reducing the switching cost between countries. The ﬁrst solution seems dif-
ﬁcult to implement due to the extreme sophistication of manufacturers logistic organization
19(see CEC (2000)). The second solution seems more promising since part of the switching costs
are administrative costs that can be lowered6. Reducing the price dispersion, clearly one of
the European Antitrust Policy objectives, may not be welfare improving: manufacturers may
react by reducing the coverage of the market. From this point of view, following Klemperer
[1995], lowering the switching costs is more likely to be welfare improving, and can be part of
or complementary to an active Competition Policy.
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21Appendices
A. Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. To show that the mixed extension of Γ(FCN,FCF) is better reply
secure for any pair of franchise contracts, it is suﬃcient to show that the property is true for any
pair of delays (τN,τF) and for every wholesale price w. From Reny (1999), corollary 5.2 p. 1044,
it suﬃces to check that Γ(FCN,FCF) is payoﬀ secure and reciprocally upper semicontinuous:
those two properties imply the better reply security.
Let us start by showing the reciprocal upper semicontinuity. We can apply Reny (1999)
proposition 5.1, p. 1044, that shows that if the sum of the payoﬀs is upper semicontinuous,
then the mixed extension of Γ(FCN,FCF) is reciprocal upper semicontinuous. To check that
the sum of the payoﬀs is upper semicontinuous, we need to check that7 for any sequence
{pn
N,pn
F} ⊆ R+×R+ such that {pn
N,pn





F)) ≤ ΠN(pN,pF) + ΠF(pN,pF). Let us consider the 3 sub-games resulting from
demands in cases 1, 2 and 3. First remark that since δ < 1, the sum of the payoﬀs is always
ﬁnite. Therefore the supremum of the sum of the payoﬀs exists and we can compute its limit.
The sum of the payoﬀs is obviously continuous along the diagonals pN = pF +￿ and pN = pF −￿,
and inside each region. Therefore it is also upper semicontinuous along the diagonals. It
remains to check that the property is true along the horizontal and vertical discontinuities.
Consider the demand system depicted in case 1. When the pair of prices belongs to the set
{(pN,pF) ∈ R+ ×R+/pN > δτN 1
1−δ −￿,pF > δτN 1
1−δ} then consumer CF does not buy the good
at all. The total demand is brutally shifted downward by 1 unit. Under the assumption that
consumers indiﬀerent between buying or not are buying the good, then at the pair of prices
were the discontinuity occurs, the limit of sum of the payoﬀs for any sequence converging to the
discontinuity is always lower or equal to the value of the sum of the payoﬀs at the discontinuity
itself. This is exactly what upper semicontinuity requires. When the pair of prices belongs
to the set {(pN,pF) ∈ R+ × R+/pN > δτN vN
1−δ,pF > δτN vN
1−δ − ￿}, the same reasoning can be
applied: no one is buying the good, meaning that total demand is shifted downward by 1 unit.
However consumer CN indiﬀerent between buying or not chooses to buy, implying that the
limit of the sum of the payoﬀs is always lower or equal to the value of the sum of the payoﬀs
at the discontinuity itself. The same argument can be applied to demand systems depicted in
cases 2 and 3.
7Deﬁnition 2 given in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)
22Let us turn to the payoﬀ security of the mixed extension of Γ(FCN,FCF). Let us deﬁne a
distance on Σ by d(σ,σ0) for any pair of probability measures (σ,σ0), and for η > 0 and σ0 ∈ Σ,
let B(σ0,η) denote an open ball of radius η around σ0, i.e. B(σ0,η) = {σ ∈ Σ /d(σ,σ0) < η}.
The mixed extension of Γ(τN,τF,w) is payoﬀ secure if (Reny (1999) p. 1033)
∀ (σN,σF) ∈ Σ × Σ, ∀ α > 0,
∃ σN, η > 0, ΠN(σN,σ0
F) ≥ ΠN(σN,σF) − α, ∀ σ0
F ∈ B(σF,η)
and ∃ σF, η > 0, ΠF(σ0
N,σF) ≥ ΠF(σN,σF) − α, ∀ σ0
N ∈ B(σN,η)
Payoﬀ security can be interpreted in the following way: for any pair of mixed strategies, each
agent has another strategy σx that gives him a payoﬀ always higher than a given level slightly
lower than what he was obtaining by playing σx (i.e. Πx(σx,σ−x)−α) for any small perturbation
in its opponent’s strategy. To put it diﬀerently players are able to be almost as well oﬀ at σx
than at σx even if the opponent is slightly modifying its strategy.
Consider RN’s proﬁt function and take η > 0. A typical diﬀerence that could appear
between σF and σ0
F is that σ0
F assigns a probability η to a low price p
F that was not used in
σF, while still using the same support. Then
R
Supp(σF) dσ0
F = 1 − η. Cases in which RF charges
high prices more often will lead to an increase in RN’s proﬁt. Sticking to the same strategy
will give him strictly more than in the situation where RF plays σF. The property is therefore
true in the case where RF charges higher prices more often.
Consider directly the case in which σ0
F assigns a weight strictly lower than σF to any price
or any interval of prices on Supp(σF). Is it possible to ﬁnd a strategy σN that leaves RN with
















Since RN’s proﬁts are piecewise linear and independent of pF, the only thing that matters
for RN are the prices he is charging with positive probabilities and the probability to get a
positive demand which depends on the supports of the two mixed strategies. He can always
play a strategy σN that reallocates the probability weights on its prices by taking ξ ∈ [0,1] from
the upper part of Supp(σN) i.e. such that
R pN(σN)
pN(σN) dσN = ξ and redistributing it to the lower
part of Supp(σN), possibly charging new values out of Supp(σN), and lower than the lower
bound of Supp(σN). The loss on the term in η in its proﬁt function will be small (η is already
23small), while the gain on the ﬁrst part of the proﬁt is clearly bigger. To put it diﬀerently RN
lowers the risk of having no demand at all, while still being able to obtain a proﬁt as close as
he wants from his initial payoﬀ by increasing the probability of selling 1 unit or 2 units. Since
payoﬀs functions are piecewise continuous, this ”quantity” eﬀect can outweigh the ”price” eﬀect
of putting more probability weights on low prices. Therefore for any small perturbation of his
opponent’s strategy, RN can ﬁnd a strategy close enough in terms of proﬁt to the one he was
previously using. The same argument can be applied on RF’s payoﬀs. Therefore the mixed
extension of the original game is payoﬀ secure.
Proof of corollary 1. From proposition 1 we know that the mixed extension of the game
Γ(τN,τF,w) is better reply secure for any pair of delays and any wholesale price. Moreover
ﬁrms sets of strategies are compact: it exists a pair of ﬁnite prices (pF,pN) such that retailer Rx
will never charge more than px for any price p−x set by its opponent. Since retailers can charge
any price px ∈ [0,px] the game is compact and metric. Therefore we can apply Reny (1999),
corollary 5.2, p. 1044: the game Γ(FCN,FCF) possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof of lemma 1. If the wholesale w is higher than the maximal willingness to pay
vN
1−δ, then
obviously retailers cannot sell and their variable proﬁts (i.e. excluding the ﬁxed fees) are equal
to 0. If w is lower than the maximal willingness to pay but higher than
vN
1−δ − ￿, retailer RF
can neither sell to its local consumer CF nor attract its foreign consumer CN while realizing a
non negative proﬁt. RF does not earn any proﬁt. Retailer RN does not face any competition in












retailers are in competition. If RN sets its price at the maximal willingness to pay of its local
consumer CN, RF is able to propose a price slightly lower than
vN
1−δ − ￿ and attract CN. CF
is still unable to buy the good as long as w > 1
1−δ. Therefore charging the highest willingness
to pay is no more possible. In fact any pair of prices (pN,pF) such that retailer RF is able to
undercut RN and realize a positive proﬁt cannot be an equilibrium. The unique equilibrium
in pure strategies is (p∗
N,p∗
F) = (w +￿,w), consumer CN buys from RN and consumer CF does
not buy unless w = 1
1−δ, in which case he buys from RF. Consider ﬁnally the case in which
w ≤ 1
1−δ: the equilibrium exists in mixed strategy. We need to prove that the upper bounds
(pN,pF) on the support of each ﬁrm’s strategy cannot be higher or equal to ( 1
1−δ +￿, 1
1−δ). Let
us assume that (pN,pF) = ( 1
1−δ +￿, 1
1−δ). In that case retailer RF could slightly reduce its upper
24price to get almost the same proﬁt when selling only to its national consumer, while selling the
good to the two consumers with a strictly positive probability. The expected proﬁt from using
an upper price slightly lower than 1
1−δ is strictly higher than the certain proﬁt from selling at
1
1−δ, therefore this price cannot be part of the support of the equilibrium strategy. May an
upper price pN = 1
1−δ + ￿ be part of the equilibrium strategy? Neither, since retailer RN is
doing a proﬁt equal to 0 in that case. He is better oﬀ reducing the upper bound to realize a
positive proﬁt. Therefore (pN,pF) = ( 1
1−δ + ￿, 1
1−δ) cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy.
Ruling out upper bounds strictly higher than this pair is immediate, since those prices are
strictly dominated in pure strategies for retailer RF. Therefore the expected proﬁts of retailers
are respectively lower than 1
1−δ + ￿ − w and 1
1−δ − w.
Proof of lemma 2. Obviously when the wholesale price is higher than δτN vN
1−δ the retailers
cannot sell the good. When w is in between δτF vN
1−δ − ￿ and δτN vN
1−δ, retailer RF never ﬁnds




When w ∈ [δτN 1
1−δ −￿,δτF vN
1−δ −￿], then retailer RN cannot charge more than w+￿+(δτN −
δτF)
vN
1−δ. Indeed any price higher would induce an undercutting by RF. The equilibrium in
pure strategies is (w + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ,w) and only consumer CN obtains the good.
When w ∈ [δτF 1
1−δ,δτN 1
1−δ − ￿], then retailer RN can either sell to consumer CN only, at a
price w + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ, or can sell to CN and CF at price δτN 1
1−δ − ￿. RF sets pF = w.
Let us compare the variable proﬁts. ΠN(w + ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN




1−δ − ￿,w) = 2 (δτN 1
1−δ − ￿ − w). We obtain immediately that ΠN(w + ￿ + (δτN −
δτF)
vN
1−δ,w) > ΠN(δτN 1






When w ∈ [0,δτF 1
1−δ], the game does not possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We
know that it has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Let us characterize the property of the
support of any mixed equilibrium. First the upper bound on the support of RF’s equilibrium
mixed strategy cannot be higher than δτF vN
1−δ − ￿: using the fact that RF has to be indiﬀerent
between any pure strategy used in the mixed one, the expected proﬁt of retailer RF would be
equal to 0, which is dominated. For the same reason, RN cannot use prices higher than δτN vN
1−δ
in its mixed strategy. Therefore since the expectation is an interior operator, the retailers ex-
pected payoﬀs have to be strictly lower than (δτN vN
1−δ − w,δτF vN
1−δ − ￿ − w).
Proof of lemma 3. The ﬁrst 3 expressions are obvious to derive using ﬁgure 2. Let us focus
25on the last case. When w ∈ [0;δτF vN
1−δ −￿] the equilibrium has to be found in mixed strategies.
Remark that RN never uses prices higher than δτN vN
1−δ in the support of its equilibrium mixed
strategy. Indeed it would do an expected proﬁt equal to 0, which is obviously dominated. For
the same reason remark that RF cannot use prices higher than δτF 1
1−δ. Therefore since putting
all the probability weights on those values cannot be an equilibrium, the expected proﬁts have
to be lower than (δτN vN
1−δ − w,δτF 1
1−δ − w).
Proof of lemma 4. When w > δτN vN
1−δ, no retailer sells the good.
When w ∈ [δτN 1
1−δ − ￿,δτN vN
1−δ], RN charges p∗
N = δτN vN
1−δ and sells the good to CN.
When w ∈ [δτF vN
1−δ −￿,δτN 1
1−δ −￿], RN can either sell only to CN at p∗
N = δτN vN
1−δ, or sell to
CN and CF at price p∗
N = δτN 1
1−δ − ￿. Comparing the proﬁts gives that RN sells to CN only if
δτN vN
1−δ − w > 2 (δτN 1
1−δ − ￿ − w), i.e. w ≥ 2δτN 1
1−δ − 2￿ − δτN vN
1−δ.
When w ∈ [δτN 1
1−δ − 2￿ − (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ,δτF vN
1−δ − ￿], RN can either sell to CN at price
w+￿+(δτN −δτF)
vN
1−δ, or sell to CN and CF at price p∗
N = δτN 1
1−δ −￿. Selling to CN only is more
proﬁtable if ￿ + (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ > 2 (δτN 1






If this value is higher than δτF vN
1−δ − ￿, then retailer RN is always better oﬀ selling to both





1−δ ≤ δτN 1
1−δ − 2￿ − (δτN − δτF)
vN
1−δ then for those
values of w, RN prefers to sell to CN only.
When w ∈ [0,δτN 1
1−δ −2￿−(δτN −δτF)
vN
1−δ], the equilibrium exists in mixed strategies. Again
the upper bounds of the supports are δτN vN
1−δ for RN and δτF vN


























Figure 1: Demands (DN,DF) when δτF vN−1
1−δ ≥ ￿ and (δτN − δτF)
vN−1



















Figure 2: Demands (DN,DF) when δτF vN−1
1−δ < ￿ and (δτN − δτF)
vN−1
















1−δ − δτN −δτF







Figure 3: Demands (DN,DF) when δτF vN−1
1−δ ≥ ￿ and (δτN − δτF)
vN−1
















1−δ vN − ￿
Delays such that CN buys to RN
if pF = δτF
1−δ
Figure 4: Consumers’s valuations when the delay τF increases
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